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The Effects of Consumer Bliss on 
Welfare Economics 
William A. Barnett 
This article explores the impact of consumer satiation on the 
functioning of a private ownership economy free from market imper- 
fections. Kenneth Arrow has proved that consumer satiability has 
no effect on the Pareto optimality of competitive equilibria;1 his 
conclusion is disproved by counter-example and his error is isolated. 
Arrow's model is corrected and then related to a concept introduced 
by David Gale.2 Although the choice of the mainstream paradigm 
is dictated by Arrow's assumptions, the corrected model provides 
one basis for illustrating issues raised by radical as well as some 
liberal economists. 
Saturation (Satiation) Consumption Bundles 
Although in many areas of economic analysis consumer insatiability 
(nonsaturation) is assumed, the applicability of that assumption in 
the field of welfare economics is questionable. In that field the 
demonstration that every competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal 
is purported to obtain for any arbitrary distribution of wealth, subject 
to what are presumed to be weak qualifications. To maintain that 
there is no one in the United States whose consumption desires would 
be satiated if he were allocated half of the nation's wealth is to 
The author is a graduate student at Carnegie-Mellon University. Substantial simplifi- 
cations and clarifications were made possible by comments received from David Cass. 
The author also is indebted to Leonard Rapping for pointing out an erroneous argument 
contained in an early draft and for assisting in the organization of the final draft. 
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affix to the theorem a qualification which is far from weak. Conversely, 
to accept the possibility of the existence of bliss points (satiation 
consumption bundles3) does not violate conditions for economic 
"perfection," since the properties of bliss points are not in conflict 
with assumptions of the lack of externalities, the selfishness of 
preferences, the perfection of knowledge, or the perfection of ration- 
ality. 
The concept of consumer satiability not only is of importance in 
theoretical welfare economics, but also has been used widely by old 
and new left economists, a few contemporary liberals, and some 
well-known earlier economists.4 Perhaps the clearest applications of 
satiability are in the writings of the classical utopians and the specula- 
tions of the Marxist theory of pure communism, which postulates 
uniformly zero prices in an environment devoid of any rationing 
devices.5 The relevancy of satiability to new left views is illustrated 
by Michael Zweig's assertion that "marginalism is appropriate as a 
technique under two fundamental conditions: 1) scarcity; 2) a desire 
for maximization (or minimization). . . . Who will be the economists 
helping to undo the artificial rat-race? Who will be the operations-ana- 
lysts in the hippie communities? Who will analyze a world in which 
more stuff is not better? In the absence of effective scarcity, margina- 
lism loses its relevance."6 John Kenneth Galbraith's applications of 
the concept of consumer satiability are widely known,7 as are those 
of some ecologists. 
The Issue 
Although all neoclassical welfare proofs and some set-theoretic wel- 
fare proofs assume nonsaturation, Arrow has demonstrated the Pare- 
to optimality of competitive equilibria in a private ownership economy 
through a remarkably simple proof, which is dependent in no way 
upon insatiability assumptions. 8 Not excluding the possibility of bliss 
points, Arrow's proof is of particular interest and relevance. The 
contention of this article is that Arrow's proof is based upon a definition 
which is valid only when consumers are insatiable. Once this definition 
has been corrected, Pareto optimality no longer need hold for competi- 
tive equilibria. 
In 1955 David Gale published an important article, "The Law of 
Supply and Demand."9 Gale, like Arrow, considered the possibility 
of bliss points, but Gale also correctly identified the possibility of 
the existence in equilibrium of what he called "savings" -goods 
supplied by the economy but never consumed. Since savings generally 
are viewed as having been motivated by a taste for future consumption, 
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Gale's term might more descriptively have been "savings by default." 
When referring to Gale's savings, this article generally will use the 
term hoarding. Gale's view is presented in a deceptively simple example 
in which he postulates the existence of a pure exchange economy 
containing two persons, Mr. A and Mr. B, and a quantity, Q, of 
one good. Mr. A is assumed to own the entire stock, while Mr. 
B owns nothing. Mr. A is satiable in the one good at a consumption 
level of P, which is assumed to be less than the total stock, Q; 
Mr. B is insatiable. 
Since the model has one good and no labor, the single good trivially 
is chosen as the numeraire with a price of one. No other good existing 
to be sacrificed, and no production existing in the model, free disposal 
is assumed implicitly. Since the model is one of pure exchange, no 
need exists to consider the merits of a profit maximization assumption. 
Mr. A will choose to consume at his saturation level and will dispose 
of the remainder of the stock, that is, of Q-P. Mr. B having nothing 
to offer, and Mr. A. wanting nothing more, Mr. B. will have no 
choice but to consume nothing. This equilibrium allocation is not 
Pareto optimal: The allocation of P units to Mr. A and Q-P units 
to Mr. B is a Pareto superior allocation. Clearly Gale's solution to 
that trivial pure exchange problem is correct. 
Gale used his simple example as a means of demonstrating the 
need for a no savings assumption in his welfare proof rather than 
to investigate the welfare effects of relaxing that assumption. Although 
his welfare proof related to a pure exchange model in which income 
in excess of the satiation level is not permitted in equilibrium, Gale 
carefully qualified the conclusion of his welfare theorem to apply 
solely to the single "important special case of a model with no 
savings."'" Arrow, on the other hand, did permit the existence of 
equilibrium income in excess of satiation," but without recognizing 
the complications illustrated by Gale. 
Since the meanings of profits, price, and market in Gale's no 
production, one good, and no exchange example are not clear, 
extensions of Gale's illustration are required to reveal the impact 
of satiation on welfare in a market economy. Such extensions will 
be developed in detail below. 
To exhibit the welfare effects of bliss points, a stationary pure 
exchange economy will be considered. 2 The case of a bliss point 
in a consumer's preferences is illustrated in Figure 1, onto which 
two budget constraints have been superimposed. P is a bliss point 
surrounded by concentric indifference curves with a larger radius 
corresponding to a lower level of satisfaction. Although along budget 
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Figure 1: Consumer Bliss Point 
constraint BB the consumer is receiving greater income, perhaps from 
corporate profits, than along budget constraint AA, in either case 
he will choose to consume at his bliss point P. In neither case will 
he consume all of his income. 
For an example of the effects of bliss points on the welfare properties 
of competitive equilibria, consider Figure 2. It illustrates a model 
of pure exchange with two commodities and two persons. The initial 
endowment allocation is at point E.13 Mr. A has a bliss point at 
Q, while Mr. B is satiated by consumption quantities in excess of 
those available in the simple economy. The price ratio having been 
set at the level defining the budget line DD, Mr. B will wish to 
consume at M. Mr. A can achieve bliss by trading at the market 
to acquire the bundle at M and then, off of the market, by consuming 
at Q while disposing of what remains of the quantity of good X 
possessed at M. 14 For each good, the quantity supplied at the market 
equals the quantity demanded at the market. Knowing nothing of the 
disposal decision, the price-setting "auctioneer" views each market 
as having been cleared. Hence consumption at M by Mr. B and 
consumption at Q by Mr. A define an equilibrium market allocation. 
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Clearly the transfer of the discarded goods to Mr. B would generate 
a Pareto superior allocation. 
Although this example illustrates that a competitive equilibrium need 
not be Pareto optimal, Arrow's proof purports to demonstrate that 
such a result is impossible, even if an attainable bliss point exists. 
Arrow's proof holds since, by his definition, a competitive equilibrium 
can exist only if the aggregate value of goods supplied ("profits"), 
determined through their maximization, is equal to the value of goods 
consumed. Figure 2 violates that equality condition. One possible 
source of Arrow's definition is the strong (equality) form of Walras's 
Law, derived by summing the budget constraints in equality form. 
But the equality form of the budget constraint itself is a conclusion 
following from two assumptions: the inequality form of the budget 
constraint (which is an assumption15), and the insatiability of prefer- 
ences. Since insatiability is not assumed in Arrow's theorem, con- 
sumers need not exhaust their budgets and the strict form of Walras's 
Law need not apply. 6 
Another possible argument exists favoring the equality in equilibrium 
of the value of goods supplied and of those consumed. It might be 
argued that the market for a nonfree good is cleared only if the 
quantity of the good supplied equals the quantity consumed. When 
satiability is permitted, that view would ignore the fact that equilibrium 
D Mr. B 
Good Y 
E 
Mr. A D Good X 
Figure 2: Pure Exchange Economy 
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consumption and market demand need not be equal; but the auctioneer 
who sets the prices is concerned solely with the equality of supply 
and demand at the market. The auctioneer has no knowledge of or 
interest in consumption or disposal of goods off of the market. He 
knows only of their sum: market demand. As a result, with bliss 
points in existence, a possibility Arrow permits, all markets can be 
cleared and all prices can be in equilibrium without the quantity of 
each nonfree good supplied by the economy equaling the quantity 
of that good consumed by consumers. Figure 2 provides an illustration 
of that fact. Arrow's definition of equilibrium is based upon an equality 
that is not applicable. 
In the above example, one Pareto optimal equilibrium could be 
attained: Mr. A could agree to transfer his unconsumed quantity of 
good X to Mr. B as a gift. The point is that, contrary to Arrow's 
assertion, such an equilibrium need not be unique. Indeed, the efficient 
allocation is only one among an uncountably infinite number of 
inefficient equilibria. In practice a choice between nonunique equilibria 
can be made only on the basis of the probable direction of deviations 
from the model's assumptions and on the basis of the model's 
robustness to such deviations. Since these choices are not relevant 
to theory, they will be left to later sections on applications. 
The Model with Production 
To illustrate the effect of bliss on economic welfare when production 
exists, consider the case of a stationary, two person, one good, one 
industry (hereafter referred to as the firm) economy; initial stocks 
of the consumer good do not exist,"7 and the firm is owned through 
inheritance solely by one of the two persons. The one laborer-manager, 
viewed as having no initial endowment, exchanges his labor for 
quantities of the one good at the rate of exchange defined by the 
wage rate. The owner, on the other hand, views work as severely 
demeaning to a person in his position-he would rather starve than 
work. Furthermore, he is assumed to be satiable in the single good, 
X, at that consumption level indicated by point B in Figure 3; his 
level of satisfaction declines as his consumption level increases or 
decreases along the Good X axis from his bliss point. 18 In Figure 
3 the production function is shown as OT, and several of the 
laborer-manager's indifference curves have been superimposed upon 
the first quadrant. The laborer-manager is assumed to be locally 
insatiable at the wage rates to be considered. 
Now let the wage rate be represented as the slope of the ray OS 
in Figure 4. The laborer-manager will wish to consume at R and 
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Good X 
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Figure 3: Technology and Preferences 
to supply L* units of labor. The firm chooses the feasible production 
point that will maximize the owner's satisfaction at the given wage 
rate. Depending upon his views concerning the function of entrepre- 
neurship, the reader can decide upon the means by which the firm's 
decision is effected. '" The cross-hatched area within KNM in Figure 
4 contains the set of possible solutions to the manager's decision 
problem. The half-line BS' is parallel to the ray OS. All points along 
the half-line BS' and, therefore, all points along the segment KM 
yield a profit level of OB measured in units of the good X. If the 
firm were to operate anywhere along KM, the owner would consume 
out of profits at B, his saturation level. Consuming at his bliss point, 
the owner could be no happier. Consider point R' on the segment 
KM as a possible production point in a competitive equilibrium. Since 
all points along KM permit the owner to attain unqualified economic 
bliss, each such point must maximize the owner's utility at the given 
wage rate; hence the point R' must. So L * is in the labor demand 
set at that wage, while X2 is in the product supply set. 
At the given wage rate, the laborer-manager's demand for the 
consumption good is X1, while the owner's demand for the consump- 
tion good is B. The total demand for the consumption good is B + X1 
- B + (X2 - B) = X2, a quantity which has been shown to be 
in the product supply set. In addition, at the given wage rate, the 
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Figure 4: Economy with Production 
laborer-manager's labor supply is L*, which is in the labor demand 
set. Hence all markets are cleared. Furthermore, the laborer-manager's 
utility is maximized for the given wage rate, while the owner's utility 
is maximized for the given wage rate and the given technology. All 
behavioral assumptions are satisfied.20 The given wage rate, the 
quantity of labor at L*, and the consumption allocation of B to the 
owner and of Xi to the laborer-manager define a market equilibrium 
in the private ownership economy."2 
Suppose, for example, that a government were to nationalize the 
firm. The government then could supply the former owner with his 
bliss consumption bundle on the condition that he continue to make 
any entrepreneurial decisions that he may have made as owner but 
with the explicit requirement that profits be maximized. Leaving the 
wage rate unchanged, the government could set the production level 
at X3 and provide the laborer with a lump-sum bonus equal to X3 
- X2. The owner is as blissfully happy as before, while the laborer- 
manager is happier than ever. The new solution being Pareto superior 
to the old solution, the market equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.22 
Furthermore, the externally controlled equilibrium, unlike the market 
equilibrium, 23 maximizes the firm's and thereby the economy's profits. 
This example indicates that profits need not be maximized in a 
competitive equilibrium. Since that result may seem surprising, the 
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applicability of the usual arguments for profit maximization will be 
considered. 
In Gerard Debreu's highly explicit set-theoretic models, the transfer 
of ownership claims is not possible. Although not always as evident, 
this characteristic is common to set-theoretic models in general, as 
has been made clear by Tjalling Koopmans: "A model that assigns 
specific production sets exhibiting decreasing returns to scale to a 
given number of producers is suitable only for tracing the effects 
of a given distribution of nontransferable knowledge and of implied 
indivisible resources. It cannot serve for discussing the best utilization 
of all available knowledge and resources when there are no impediments 
to their diffusion or transfer of control."24 Since for theoretical as 
well as empirical reasons decreasing returns to scale generally are 
believed to be a common characteristic of production functions, 
Koopmans's observation is highly relevant and will be central to much 
of the following discussion. 
In the market solution illustrated in Figure 4, one might presume 
that by purchasing the firm the laborer-manager could improve his 
lot. Since such ownership transfers are not permitted within set- 
theoretic models, the possibility need not be considered. However, 
in this case the limitations of the set-theoretic method are not serious; 
since the owner can achieve no higher satisfaction than that which 
already is available to him, the laborer can offer nothing that would 
ensure the acceptance of an offer. The continued ownership of the 
firm by the original owner defines a legitimate stationary allocation 
of ownership claims. 
As described by Koopmans, the number of firms is fixed in 
set-theoretic models. Hence in Figure 4 no consideration need be 
given to the possibility of the laborer-manager's building a new firm 
even if he possessed the necessary wealth. This limitation of set- 
theoretic models need not overly restrict the applicability of Figure 
4. Perhaps the single owner monopolizes required entrepreneurial 
ability; perhaps he owns the total supply of some scarce factor required 
in the production of the one good; or perhaps he has acquired a 
patent on the product. 
A common argument in favor of the profit maximization assumption 
is that firms which do not maximize profits will fail through the 
competition of more efficient firms. Since in Figure 4 all profits are 
imputed as rent to the scarce factors monopolized by the firm's owner, 
those factors are underpaid by the inefficient operation of the firm. 
No other firm being able to purchase the monopolized factors, no 
other firm could benefit from their underpayment. Furthermore, all 
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economic rent having been imputed to the scarce factors, no profits 
remain to serve as an incentive to entry through the use of other 
nonmonopolized factors. In any event, the basic set-theoretic assump- 
tion of a fixed number of firms excludes the possibility of entry 
by any means. 
But suppose that in the unregulated market economy the laborer- 
manager were to attempt to reap the benefits of the controlled 
equilibrium by setting the firm's output at X3 rather than X2. The 
added output would accrue as profits to the owner, who would dispose 
of them. Without access to governmental authority, the laborer-man- 
ager would have no means of acquiring the added production from 
the satiated owner; as a result he would not be motivated to prefer 
production at N to production at R'. 
As indicated in the previous section, Arrow's assumption of the 
equality of the value of goods supplied and of those consumed should 
be dropped from the definition of equilibrium. This section indicates 
that the assumption of profit maximization also might be dropped 
from that definition. 25 Although the elimination of profit maximization 
would add realism to the definition of equilibrium, no fundamental 
error would result if profit maximization were retained, since profits 
in excess of those desired would not be consumed. 
Applications 
As noted earlier, Galbraith as well as old and new left economists 
have dealt with applications for which this article provides a theory; 
a further application discussed by Joseph Schumpeter will be consid- 
ered below. Common to all of these views is the conviction that 
satiation is an affluent society problem. As will be made clear in 
this section, satiation has its most unfavorable effects on the operation 
of a private ownership economy when the distribution of wealth is 
severely unequal, a possibility which can exist in the most nonaffluent 
societies of the Third World as well as in the most superaffluent 
societies of the future. 
In previous sections, the discussion has been strictly formal to 
permit adherence to the assumptions of Arrow's model and to provide 
an extension of Gale's example sufficient to demonstrate the relation 
of satiation to theoretical welfare economics. No market imperfections 
were assumed. To construct the desired counter-examples, no unique- 
ness proof was required, and no uniqueness claim was made; 
however, in some of the widely known applications of the satiability 
concept, deviations from a perfect market assumption could be viewed 
as implicit, since uniqueness is commonly suggested. 
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The crucial assumption in any attempt to discriminate between 
nonunique equilibria in an economy containing satiated consumers 
is the traditional one of selfish preferences. According to that perfect 
market assumption, a consumer's preferences are related solely to 
his own consumption; he is not influenced in any way by the 
consumption bundles attained or desired by any other consumer. 
Alternatively, if consumers were insatiably charitable, otherwise 
satiated consumers willingly would donate excess goods to any persons 
not yet satiated. Deviations from selfishness in the opposite direction 
can be achieved by permitting envy, the assumption of relative wants. 
With respect to moderate wealth transfers, charitableness may well 
be a plausible assumption,26 even within a competitive economy; but 
with respect to the massive voluntary shifts in wealth and social 
class that would be required to eliminate economic waste in most 
common applications of satiability, envy is a far more reasonable 
one. The assumption of envy in such a model could be viewed as 
permitting insatiability in status and prestige concomitant with satiabi- 
lity in goods and services. 27 
Economic Development 
In a tradition-bound society where the rich are very rich and the 
poor are very poor, where the name Calvin is unknown,28 where 
the fixed factor land is held in few hands, and where education is 
the prerogative of the few, perhaps entrepreneurs may be more 
interested in protecting their privileged positions than in promoting 
initiative in peasant-farmers or in employees. In such a society one 
might expect to find huge bureaucracies in which the buck is always 
passed and no one rocks the boat. Firmly entrenched in the upper 
class, the nation's wealth owners perceive the existence of no higher 
social status to which to aspire and allow "savings by default" in 
such forms as hoards of jewels and gold to accumulate without limit. 29 
In an economy having a high pure interest rate, the consistent 
channeling of savings away from high yield, low risk assets is evidence 
that the utility maximization of investors is not representable by a 
profit maximization process.30 Whatever physical capital might be 
brought into the economy through investment by foreigners is not 
of basic value in solving the country's development problems; such 
capital is mobile and could have been purchased by the country itself 
if its resource owners possessed the necessary motivation to invest 
their hoards of savings by default in imported capital goods. The 
scarcity of the mobile factor capital is a symptom of the country's 
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problem. The cause is the inefficient use of the nation's closely held 
entrepreneurial ability, land, patents, and other fixed factors. 
The Future 
In his Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter expressed 
a once fashionable concern about the effect of future affluence upon 
the "typically bourgeois kind of profit motive" and thereby upon 
"the efficiency of the capitalist engine of production." 31 He predicted 
that the entrepreneur eventually would discover that his aspirations, 
both social and economic, had been satisfied, and that his support 
for the capitalist order had begun to wane. With his children not 
sharing their predecessors' entrepreneurial drive toward continued 
economic accumulation and acquisition, economic stagnation would 
be followed by a weakly opposed conversion to socialism. 
Figure 4 provides an illustration of the pretransition stage, in which 
the inherited income of a nonmaterialistic entrepreneur is in stationary 
stagnation at a saturation level, his savings are zero, and economic 
efficiency is low. The incentive for the change to socialism emanates 
from the preferences of the laborer-manager, while the entrepreneur, 
to be supported at a saturation level after the transition, offers no 
resistance to the conversion: Envy is not assumed. 
Conclusion 
The assumption relaxed by this article is insatiability. The relation 
between that assumption and those of profit maximization and market 
clearing has been considered. Through extensions of Gale's simple 
example, the analysis demonstrates that competitive equilibria in a 
private ownership economy need not be Pareto optimal. 32 The possi- 
bility of the existence of non-Pareto optimal equilibria in an unregulated 
laissez-faire economy stems from the society's inherently rigid alloca- 
tion of its wealth. In reaching this conclusion, the paper's methods 
of analysis, criteria of optimality, and paradigmatic framework of 
discussion are in all instances those reflecting most favorably upon 
the performance of a private ownership economy: No market imper- 
fections are assumed. 
Notes 
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(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), pp. 507-32. Arrow's 
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goods were distributed free, without rationing of any kind. The reason 
for the communal society's ultimate dissolution can be traced to the 
society's religious belief in celibacy, a belief which doomed the society 
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points is not in conflict with characteristics intrinsic to "human nature." 
On theoretical grounds the rapidly growing literature on the allocation 
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to the rate of consumption goods. The literature on the subject originated 
with Gary Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time," Economic 
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Professional Paper No. 36 (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 
June 1970), pp. 97-99. 
4. According to Max Weber, "a man does not 'by nature' wish to earn 
more and more money, but simply to live as he is accustomed to live 
and earn as much as is necessary for that purpose." Alfred Marshall 
formulated as a law of economic behavior that "there is an endless 
variety of wants, but there is a limit to each separate want. This familiar 
and fundamental tendency of human nature may be stated in the law 
of satiable wants or of diminishing utility." Weber's statement can be 
found in his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 60, while Marshall's discussion 
can be found in his Principles of Economics, 7th ed. (London: Macmillan, 
1916), p. 93. 
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communism to contemporary radical economics is contained in Howard 
Sherman's Radical Political Economy (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 
1972), chaps. 22 and 23. Also see his article, "The Economics of Pure 
Communism," in the Winter 1970 edition of The Review of Radical Political 
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would be at a loss; total consumer spending would fall and savings would 
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or Son of Affluence," Public Interest 9 (1967): 104. 
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4. 
12. Precluding savings and restricting discussion to one time period, station- 
arity is assumed to permit illustration in two dimensions. When considering 
more dimensions than can be displayed geometrically, one can incorporate 
savings, investment, and growth into the discussion by adopting the 
conventions explained by Gerard Debreu in his Theory of Value (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959), pp. 28-36. 
13. Although the Edgeworth box diagram is commonly used to illustrate 
the allocation of wealth, much of the discussion in this article is understood 
most easily in terms of the allocation of income. In that case, the 
endowment can be viewed as single-period income paid in goods. 
14. Although the illustrated equilibrium is not unique, it is attained through 
highly plausible behavior. Alternatively, suppose Mr. A were to attempt 
to move directly from point E to point Q through market transactions; 
that is, suppose he were to demand his bliss point at the market. The 
rate of exchange that would characterize such a transaction would be 
the slope of the line from E to Q. Since that rate differs from the market 
price ratio, he would not be acting as a price taker. If desired, uniqueness 
of the illustrated equilibrium could be established by assuming that good 
Y, tattoos, for example, is nondisposable. 
15. The weak form of the budget constraint also could be viewed as a 
conclusion, but only within the context of a much more general model 
than that postulated by Arrow. Such a model would deal with questions 
of freedom, power, and the evolution of economic institutions and systems. 
Insight into these issues and their implications can be acquired from 
Warren Samuels's "Welfare Economics, Power, and Property," in Gene 
Wunderlich and W. L. Gibson, Jr., Perspectives of Property (University 
Park: Institute for Research on Land and Water Resources, Pennsylvania 
State University, 1972), pp. 61-148. Also see Zweig, "New Left," p. 
68. 
16. The weak (inequality) form of Walras's Law must and does hold even 
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if markets are not in equilibrium. For the equilibrium allocation illustrated 
in Figure 2, the strong form of Walras's Law also holds, if demand 
is interpreted to be market demand rather than consumption. That result 
follows, since all markets have been shown to be cleared; hence the 
value of excess supply in each individual market is zero. 
17. Although more difficult to illustrate, the conclusion is unchanged when 
initial stocks of the consumer good are assumed to exist. 
18. For the purist who might wish to deal with preferences having "nicer" 
properties, a conventional bliss point could be used. The rest of the 
argument would be the same, since in each case discussed below the 
owner will choose his bliss consumption bundle. 
19. Although the details of management procedures are not relevant to 
economic theory, one conclusion about administrative policy is dictated 
by the theory of the firm in Figure 4, which results from the model's 
behavioral assumptions. Any managerial system that would generate 
just-satiating profits is equally in agreement with the model's assumptions 
as one that generates supersatiating profits; if acquired, excess profits 
could be discarded by the owner at no cost. Since the owner will be 
at bliss in either case, his employee could own nothing of any value 
to his employer. Hence the employee could have no means to influence 
the owner to provide (or not to provide) rewards or incentives for profits 
in excess of satiation. 
20. As discussed below, if profit maximization were assumed, essentially 
the same result would obtain following the owner's disposal of unwanted 
goods. 
21. One might expect that the existence of inefficiency in equilibrium reflects 
an excess supply of some factor in terms of real efficient units rather 
than nominal units. Here one finds an illustration in the factor market 
of a phenomenon previously related solely to the market for consumption 
goods. With labor in Figure 4 measured in efficient units, the market 
for labor is cleared. The satiation of the owner permits the inefficient 
use within his firm of those units over which he has purchased control 
at the market. The market system is unaware of the firm's internal "excess 
supply" of labor. Also observe that the internal inefficient use of labor 
need not imply its overpayment relative to the disutility of work. The 
unpleasantness of repetitive, misdirected, or useless work can be at least 
as great as that of fully productive labor. 
In applications, consideration of the internal underutilization of capital 
is more revealing than that of labor. Again the market remains cleared, 
with zero capital supplied at the market at all capital prices. 
22. It also can be shown that one market equilibrium can be Pareto superior 
to another: Choices between some equilibria can be made through the 
utilization of the Pareto optimality criterion. For example, market equilibria 
Pareto superior to the allocation under consideration could be illustrated 
by raising the wage rate in Figure 4. As in the pure exchange example, 
the point is that the efficient allocation, far from being unique, is one 
among an uncountable number of inefficient equilibria, between which 
the model can discriminate only if deviations from some assumptions 
are permitted. 
23. The term market equilibrium will be used solely with respect to a private 
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ownership economy devoid of any governmental intervention. 
24. Tjalling C. Koopmans, Three Essays on the State of Economic Science 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), p. 66. 
25. Note that the productive inefficiency that may obtain when the owners 
of a firm have achieved economic bliss need not result in the existence 
of low profits. Each firm in such models is presumed to own a scarce 
resource, say, downtown land, fertile agricultural land, a patent, or perhaps 
exceptional entrepreneurial ability. The quantity and scarcity of such 
factors owned may be great. With profits in this model being the rent 
to these factors, efficient exploitation of scarce factors may not be required 
to achieve seemingly high profits. Since the stockholders or their ancestors 
may have paid dearly for these resources, the yield on the original 
investment may be low; but despite his past sacrifices, or the past sacrifices 
of his ancestors, or perhaps the past sacrifices of his nation's victorious 
invading armies, he is now at bliss. 
26. Harold Hochman and James Rodgers have demonstrated the need for 
moderate income redistribution to achieve Pareto optimality when prefer- 
ences exhibit charitableness. But without redistribution, the original 
inefficient equilibria become efficient when preferences are selfish; their 
conclusions depend upon the existence of externalities in consumption 
and therefore formally are unrelated to the proof of Arrow's theorem. 
See their "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," American Economic Review 
59, no. 4 (September 1969): 542-57. For further discussion see their 
observations and those of others in American Economic Review 60, no. 
5 (December 1970): 988-1002. 
27. Envy could be incorporated formally into the illustrations by assuming 
that increased consumption by others shifts down one's utility function 
without changing the shape of the indifference curves, that is, that an 
envy component monotonically decreasing in the consumption of others 
is added onto one's utility function. Since the consumption of others 
would result only in the relabeling of one's indifference curves, the 
geometry of the diagrams would be unchanged. The previously illustrated 
inefficient allocations not only would be market equilibria but also would 
be unique. 
28. The controversial sociological view relating industrialization to Protes- 
tantism is contained in Weber, The Protestant Ethic. 
29. The existence of such hoarded savings concomitant with the existence 
of high interest rates could be viewed as evidence of extreme risk aversion 
rather than of satiation. Since the most "insatiably" acquisitive entrepre- 
neurs tend in reality to be the most aggressive risk takers, to postulate 
extreme risk aversion on the part of one who can easily afford risk 
is to provide little more than an overly complicated explanation of a 
simple phenomenon: satiation. With regard to the merits of such overly 
involved ad hoc theories, refer again to footnote 3 on Friedman's discussion 
of valid methodology. 
30. Some may believe that the source of the unfavorable performance of 
traditional Third World societies is the leisure choice of the wealthholding 
class. If that explanation should be correct, the wealthy must possess 
a monopoly on skills that cannot be acquired through any amount of 
education or experience. Otherwise, unlimited leisure could be acquired 
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by the wealthholding class through the delegation of managerial responsi- 
bility to professionally educated and trained administrators. 
Furthermore, the explanation cannot be found in time-preference 
considerations. The problem of such economies is not that of accumulating 
enough savings, but that of channeling already existing savings into the 
most productive capital investments. See, for example, John Maynard 
Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1935), p. 337; also see Milton Friedman, 
A Theory of the Consumption Function (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1957), p. 236. 
31. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1950), p. 160. On p. 113, Schumpeter stated his basic 
question on the distant future: "For every given state of human wants 
. . .there is . . . a definite amount of fixed and circulating capital that 
will spell saturation. . . . But is it not conceivable that wants may 
some day be so completely satisfied as to become frozen forever after?" 
A similar view was expressed more strongly by Keynes in his Essays 
in Persuasion (New York: Norton & Co., 1963), pp. 366-69. 
32. Stated equivalently, the private ownership economy does not exhibit the 
property of efficiency. Arrow's famous converse theorem demonstrates 
under substantially stronger assumptions that the private ownership 
economy does possess the property called unbiasedness. The two proofs 
are independent. Furthermore, Arrow's proofs deal with a laissez-faire, 
perfect market economy in which a rigid allocation of wealth is part 
of the economy's definition; but unbiasedness relates to the efficacy 
of externally imposed wealth redistribution. Hence, unbiasedness deals 
with actions exogenous to the existing economy-actions, in fact, defining 
a new laissez-faire "economy." Efficiency, on the other hand, is an 
inherent property characterizing the operation of an economy free from 
external intervention. The present article is unrelated to Arrow's proof 
of unbiasedness and is not intended to contradict that proof. 
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